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“To turn one idea into more shapes than Proteus”: 
The copious use of words in Erasmus and Milton
 
by Larisa Kocic-Zámbóné
The present article aims to present a critical application of Richard Waswo’s 
notion of the “cosmetic” aspect of language in the Renaissance, with a spe-
cial focus on Erasmus and Milton within a framework of two related issues: 
Questione della Lingua and Imitatio.
 No human body part is so cautiously constrained by Nature than 
our tongue. Or so Erasmus claims in his Lingua [The Tongue] (1525). For 
while our eyes are merely covered with “a frail membrane, suited only for 
sleep”, Nature “buried the tongue virtually in a dungeon, and bound it by 
many bonds” (1989, 268). Erasmus also reminds his readers that, in fact, 
Varro thought the word lingua “tongue” to come from ligare “to bind.”1 And 
as if this biding were not enough to constrain this protean member, Nature 
set in its path “the double rampart and barrier of the thirty-two teeth” and, 
in addition, “the double doors of the lips” (ibid). The reason for this thor-
ough biding of the tongue lies in its ambivalent properties which render it a 
simultaneous source of malevolent and benevolent discursive agencies:
O ambivalent organ, from which such a great plague of life can spring up for men, 
and yet from it such benefits could flow, if anyone directed it as they should! […] 
For the tongue exercises equal domination whether you wish to save or destroy. 
[…] The tongue is Ate, strife personified, if it lacks a pilot. It is a horn of plenty, 
if you use it well. It is Eris, rouser of quarrels, but the same tongue is Grace, who 
wins good will. It is Erinys, the bringer of all evils, but it likewise calms all things. 
It is the venom of the asp if it acts with ill will, but a universal antidote if good 
intentions control it. It is the source of wars and civil strife, but it is also parent to 
peace and concord. It overthrows city-states and kingdoms, but it also founds and 
establishes them. Finally it is the deviser of death, but equally the bestower of life.  
(Erasmus 1898, 365)
1  Isidore of Seville in his Etymologies particularizes this by saying that “Varro 
thinks that the tongue, lingua, was named from binding food, ligare; others because it binds 
words [Linguae a lingando cibo putat Varro nomen impositum. Alii, quod per articulatos 
sonos verba ligat]” (Orig. XI.51; see also Mazzio 1998, 98, 114n19)
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 The contrary motion of the tongue, both in respect of its dis-
cursive agencies and physical motion,2  was a source of anxiety both 
in pagan and biblical antiquity as seen by the vast number of classical 
allusions in Erasmus’s Lingua. But this was not the only aspect of the 
anxiety about the tongue — especially in its meaning of language —, 
for the initial anxiety was intensified in the Renaissance by the Ques-
tione della Lingua: the pertinent question whether (or when) to write 
in Latin or in a vernacular.
As the name of the Questione della Lingua suggest, Italy was the first 
to confront the language-question, with Dante pioneering the de-
bate. In Il Convivio [The Banquet] (1304/1307) Dante justifies at 
length his choice of writing in vernacular Italian and in the process 
establishes the crucial difference between Latin and the vernacular 
language: the former is eternal and incorruptible, while the latter is 
unstable and corruptible, being constantly fashioned and, thus, sus-
ceptible to change. So much so, that “in the cities of Italy […] we 
find that within the last fifty years many words have become obsolete, 
been born, and been altered” to the point “that if those who departed 
this life a thousand years ago were to return to their cities, they would 
believe that they were occupied by foreigners, because the language 
would be at variance with their own” (I.5).3 For Dante these observa-
tions, despite his genuine love and devotion for Italian, establish the 
sovereignty of Latin, the beauty of which is seen in the harmonious 
correspondence of its parts. In addition, the parts of a language cor-
respond “more properly” in Latin than in the vernacular, “because the 
vernacular follows custom [i.e. use], while Latin follows art [i.e. the 
rules of grammar]” (1.5).
2  For the ambivalence inherent in representations of the tongue in early 
modern England see Mazzio 1998.
3  Dante here notes his intention to elaborate the matter more fully in a 
treatise on Eloquence in the Vernacular. And indeed, in February of 1305 Dante 
was at work on De Vulgari Eloquentia, in which he argues for the establishment of 
a “illustrious” vernacular that could serve as the medium for a national literature. 
Richard Waswo blames the relative obscurity of the treatise on the fact that it was 
written in Latin (1987, 51-52).
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All of the above mentioned features established Latin as the decisive 
scholarly tool, the constancy of which was sharply contrasted with the 
versatility of the tongues in use. It was the sine qua non of the edu-
cated and, in John K. Hale’s words, “a triple gateway: to preferment, 
to the intellectual life of antiquity, and to active membership of the 
European intelligentsia” (2005, 2). Its universal gravitational pull “en-
abled humanist to study and teach everywhere […] and no humanist 
ever voted for the vernacular at the expense of Latin’s portability” (3). 
Those who choose to write in their vernacular tongues where, there-
fore, aware of a certain loss, a sense of sacrifice, especially in respect 
to the durability of their work.4 Even in England, where the English 
vernacular supplanted Latin (and French) as the language of law and 
government by 1500 and by 1540 even the liturgical language of the 
church (4), the notion of eternal Latin versus transitory vernacular 
persisted well into the seventeenth century, as evinced by Edmund 
Waller’s poem “Of English Verse” first published in 1668:
Poets may boast, as safely vain, 
Their work shall with the world remain; 
Both bound together live or die, 
The verses and the prophecy.
But who can hope his line should long 
Last in a daily changing tongue? 
While they are new, envy prevails, 
And as that dies, our language fails.
[…]
Poets that lasting marble seek 
Must carve in Latin, or in Greek; 
We write in sand; our language grows, 
And like the tide our work o’erflows…  
  (Waswo 1987, 57)
4  Montaigne, thus, writes in his Essays: “I write for few men and few years. 
If duration were the question, the work should be committed in more rigid lan-
guage. Given the continual variations that ours has undergone up to now, who can 
hope it will be used in its present form fifty years from now? Day after day it is slip-
ping through our fingers, and in my lifetime half has already altered. We say that 
now it is perfect. As each century said the same for its own. I take care not to stop 
there as long as it pursues this constant flight and deformation” (3.9.982; in Jean-
neret 2001, 178)
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In these instances of anxiety about the mutability of the native tongue 
one can observe a change in the assumed relation between language 
and meaning. The two extreme points of the Renaissance semantic 
shift — referential versus relational language, as described by Richard 
Waswo in Language and meaning in the Renaissance — are already dis-
cernible, I believe, in Dante’s Banquet. On the one hand, the relation-
ship between language and meaning in case of Latin is ontologically 
bound: “language, which is constituted to express human thought, is 
virtuous when it does this, and more completely it does this, the more 
virtuous it is” (Convivio I.5). Hence, the supremacy of Latin, for it 
“expresses many things conceived in the mind which the vernacular 
cannot” because “the vernacular follows custom [usus] while Latin 
follows art [arte]” (ibid). Latin is, therefore, the referential language 
par excellence, since it “cannot undergo change” and whose transmis-
sion is consequently uninterrupted by time or space: “Thus in the an-
cient Latin comedies and tragedies […] we find the same Latin as we 
have today” (ibid). On the other hand, the correspondence of words 
to preextant things (“things conceived in the mind”) is compromised 
in the case of vernaculars by their constant shifts and alterations in 
following custom/use instead of art/grammar.
 However, it was in a century after Dante that the semantical 
shift could take its real effect. For the writers to follow the lead of 
Dante and to choose their vernaculars over Latin, the very confidence 
which Dante had in the incorruptible transmission of Latin at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century had to be shaken by an awareness 
that a historical rapture had taken place, and that not even Latin was 
a safeguard against loss and change.
 That language had a past was something even generations be-
fore the Renaissance were aware of. Yet it was, in Waswo’s words, 
“[t]he ‘rebirth’ of the classical past through the acutely self-conscious 
midwifery of Renaissance humanist” that “created an awareness of 
the historical context of usage in language that gradually came to 
be treated as semantically constitutive” (1987, 79). Lorenzo Valla in 
particular played a crucial role in forming this awareness. Renowned 
in his own day as the author of the Elegantiae linguae Latinae (1471) 
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— an elaborate account of the grammar, diction and style of the clas-
sical Latin — Valla lay the foundations of a philology that challenged 
the received semantics of reference. His philological methodology 
was dazzlingly simple in concept (although not in execution). Aim-
ing to recover the eloquence of Roman antiquity, Valla conducted an 
empirical survey of how classical writers actually used their Latin and, 
consequently, exposed a temporal distinction in syntactic and lexical 
usages of Latin between ancient Rome and medieval Europe.5 Waswo 
summarizes the philosophical and theoretical import of his work, and 
the challenge it posed, as: 
the profoundly disturbing demand for the literal re-vision not merely of 
what we think but of how we are able to think anything at all. […] Valla 
attempted to conceive of signification as different from, other than, the res 
significata whether in the world or in the mind: as a function of words and 
their use, not as their objects of reference. For him, words had cognitive 
force, and meaning was an activity multiply determined by grammatical 
relationships and historical contexts. (1987, 111-112)
 Valla contemporaries might not have understood the im-
pact of his work in full, yet the diffusion of his historical interpre-
tative practice was widely felt in debates on rhetoric, on emerging 
protestant biblical hermeneutics and, naturally, on language.6 It was 
5  Valla applied the method most notably to expose the Roman imperial 
decree, the Donatio Constantini —ensuring the papal dominance over the Western 
Roman Empire as the legacy of Constantine’s donation, transfering the authority 
over Rome and the western part of the Empire from the Emperor to Pope Sylvester 
I. — as a historical fraud employing a vernacular style conclusive of a much later 
era than its alleged provenance. Christopher B. Coleman, the English translator 
of Valla’s proof, De falso credita et ementita Constantini Donatione declamatio 
(1439/1440), noted its significance thus: “[F]or the first time, [Valla] used effective-
ly the method of studying the usage of words in the variations of their meaning and 
application, and other devices of internal criticism which are the tools of historical 
criticism today” (1922, 3; in Waswo 1987, 88).
6  Just how late are the notions sowed by Vala in their ripening, see Tibor 
Fabiny’s article, “Literature: A New Paradigm of Biblical Interpretation” (Fabiny 
1999, 11-29). In it Fabiny confirms the paradigm-shift of biblical interpretation 
that turns to language and puts the locus of meaning in the text itself as opposed 
tot he theological and the historical apporach in which the locus of maning was/is 
“behind the text, either in the ‘doctrine‘ or in the ‘event‘“ (14). Following Northrop 
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through him, as Waswo elsewhere noted, “that humanist philologist 
discovered time” and, in turn, “it was history, by observing the fact of 
change in all languages, that made it possible to liberate and dignify 
the vernaculars, to perceive their status and potency as equal to those 
of Latin and Greek” (1987, 59).
 Similarly, Michel Jeanneret, in his study of Renaissance’s 
“transformist sensibility”, notes the opportunity and challenge per-
ceived in the aging of the antique heritage by scholars promoting the 
vernacular. In his assessment of this challenge, Jeanneret resorts to a 
Proteus-reminiscent description of language struggle: 
[I]in spite of frustrations, most writers preferred to struggle with a flexible 
living tongue rather than serve a rigid dead language. The Latin conserved 
in the Middle Ages was certainly impure, but active and flexible. With influ-
ence of philologists and Ciceronian purists and an awareness that a histori-
cal rupture had taken place, Latin [of the antiquity] became an untouchable 
relic, a monument out of reach of the moderns. Reviving that inert object 
would mean surrendering to the fatality of an invariable language, abdicat-
ing the freedom to act on language and adapt it to new demands. (2001 
181-182).
The same liberating effect of the use of vernaculars, as noted by Was-
wo and Jeanneret so far, is the final conclusion John K. Hale comes 
to when expounding the language choices Milton had to face.7 For 
although Milton was inclined to seek, as his contemporary Edmund 
Waller wrote, the “lasting marbles” of poetry, and quite capable of 
Frye’s initiative of perceiving biblical language as “the language of proclamation, 
‘the vehicle of revelation’”, Fabiny maintains that biblical language is “much closer 
to the poetic-figurative rather than to a plain, referential ‘literal’ language… As op-
posed to the denovative- referential language of science, biblical language, especially 
that of the prophecies, is emotive, associative and connotative” and “radiates words 
with power, the purpose of its rhetoric is to affect, transform and change its reader” 
(15).
7  Hale has exounded the impact of Milton’s many languages in two book 
length studies, in Milton’s Languages: The Impact of Multilingualism on Style (2005) 
and in Milton as Multilingual (2007).  The first book focuses on the multilingual-
ism of Milton’s English works, while the latter book deals more exclusively with 
Milton’s Latin, Greek, Italian and Hebrew texts.
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carving “in Latin, or in Greek”, he, nevertheless, chose “to struggle 
with a flexible living tongue” of his own. In The Reason of Church 
Government Urged against Prelaty (1642), book two, he divulges of 
himself the following confession/vocation: 
I began thus far to assent […] that by labour and intense study, (which 
I take to be my portion in this life,) joined with the strong propensity of 
nature, I might perhaps leave something so written to after-times, as they 
should not willingly let it die. These thoughts at once possessed me, and 
these other; that if I were certain to write as men buy leases, for three lives 
and downward, there ought no regard be sooner had than to God’s glory, by 
the honour and instruction of my country. For which cause, and not only 
for that I knew if would be hard to arrive at the second rank among the 
Latins, I applied myself to that resolution, which Ariosto followed against 
the persuasion of Bembo, to fix all the industry and art I could unite to 
the adorning of my native tongue; not to make verbal curiosites the end, 
(that were a toilsome vanity,) but to be an interpreter and relater of the best 
and sagest things, among mine own citizens throughout this island in the 
mother dialect. (Hughes 1957, 668)
 When Milton writes about becoming “an interpreter and 
relater of the best and sagest things”, he has in mind the practice 
of Imitatio,8 that is, “emulation”, not some slavish copying. It en-
tails simultaneously the ambition for originality and the following 
of proven exemplars, as in the opening invocation of Paradise Lost, 
where Milton’s “Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rime” (1.16) 
echoes Ariosto’s “Cosa non detta in prosa mai, né in rima” (Orl. Fur. 
1.2) only to prove himself the more original in distinguishing his 
theme from those of previous epic poems, including Orlando Furioso 
(PL 9.25-41). Indeed, it is the question of Imitatio in relation to the 
Questione della Lingua which brings us back to Jeanneret’s observa-
tion about writers struggling with their protean mother tongues, and 
how it applies to Milton.
8  I follow Hale in rendering Imitatio with an upper-case I, hence, distin-
guishing „the Roman idea from Aristotle’s mimesis on the one side and from Plato’s 
derogatory sense, ’imitativeness’, on the other” (2005a, 208n2).
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It is certainly not a simple application. John K. Hale, who is with-
out doubt the single expert among contemporary Milton scholars on 
Milton’s multilingualism, devotes a whole book to the complexity of 
Milton’s language choices.9 Relaying on his excellent introduction, I 
will try to encapsulate his observations pertaining to my argument.
 Taking into the account the rawness and the impurities of a 
mother-tongue (in Milton’s age), Hale wonders if Imitatio could not 
work better by vernaculars than by Latin. After all, vernaculars did 
“offer greater scope for originality, right down at the cellular level, 
of words, phrases, lines of verse — the levels where poetry is alive or 
most dead” (2005, 11). But despite the challenge posed by the ver-
naculars, the choice was not an obvious one. Hale, building on Ann 
Moss’s argument about the deeply personal and anxious dimension of 
bilingualism10, claims that humanists “did not need to choose once 
and for all (especially as Latin was their ‘mistress’!)” (14). The human-
ists, Milton included, went on writing in Latin for some purposes. 
Vernaculars were favored for endeavors of high ambition, like po-
etry, but more often than not the announcements of those ambitions 
were made in Latin, along with the defenses for using vernaculars. 
When the goal was “European or pedagogical consumption”, their 
choice was again Latin (6). The choices of languages, thus, “resulted 
in complexities, paradoxes, changes and revisions of mind within the 
clear main current flowing away from Latin” (11). “The texts of the 
humanist and their vernacular counterparts seem to draw from their 
very uncertainties, from their protean shifts of style and intellectual 
contexts, an unfailing supply of color and energy” (Castor & Cave 
1984, xvi; in Hale 2005, 11).
 Therefore, in Hale’s view, Milton “did not give up his lan-
guages”, rather, “the interinanimating of his languages increased […] 
until his languages came to intersect where they could best intersect, 
within his English” (57).
 In order to illustrate the not so easily disposed dilemma of 
language choice, Hale turns to intertextuality, because “it works at 
9  The already mentioned Milton’s Languages: The Impact of Multilingualism 
on Style. 
10  Moss 1994, 61-74.
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such a local level that it is the nuts and bolts of Imitatio: in the feeling 
of palimpsest in individual words, phrases and lines of verse, the poet-
ic texture honours the ancient world and the post-Roman reception” 
(Hale 2005, 12). The creation of such a palimpsest comes “more read-
ily” in Latin by using words, phrases, or even whole lines from Latin 
masters. Already in vernaculars abounding in Latin-derived words 
the task becomes harder, and increasingly so in English. Nevertheless, 
Hale does not consider it a foregone conclusion whether one chooses 
(or chose) to do what is harder, or what can be more complete. In par-
ticular, he sees Milton “choosing what gave him the more options”, 
that is, English, since it “gave him almost all the options which Latin 
gave, and some which Latin could not” (12). Hale summarizes and 
explains this as follows: 
Using Latin words and metres to emulate Roman exemplars like Virgil, 
Ovid, Horace, he would so readily call into view their words that too much 
might show through the palimpsest; not necessarily dwarfing him, but ob-
scuring his own sense or distracting from it (like a simile whose vehicle 
crushes the tenor). The challenge was to ensure that his thought command-
ed more attention than did the words or allusions […] Composing in Eng-
lish produced the reverse dilemma. In English Milton could not summon 
up Virgil or others so easily or casually, because he could not use so many 
Latin-derived words within English. The task was apparently far harder than 
in Latin. Yet Milton gains the option to foreground the thought and not the 
words, or the interaction of thoughts with words, and both options enabled 
an interaction of infinite variety. The more stringent needs of English Imi-
tatio were, finally, more liberating. (2005, 12-13) 
 But one did not experience freedom of Imitatio only when 
writing in the vernacular. With the new sense of history, and the 
awareness of a past irrevocably lost (an awareness fostered by Valla’s 
philological method), antiquity receded and vanished with the very 
moment of its rediscovery. But instead of mourning for its loss, and 
nourishing negative nostalgia, most humanists engaged in the salvag-
ing of its goods by “inserting a measure of novelty in the hiatus” 
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(Jeanneret 2001, 142). As if replaying the encounter between Greece 
and Rome, they “aspired to be both victors and vanquished, free and 
faithful, different and differential like the Romans” (ibid). Conse-
quently, imitation was seen, on the one hand, as “mimetic devotion” 
minimizing the effect of history, and, on the other hand, as “exploita-
tion of the eclipses of the past” for present use and benefit (ibid).11
The best way to illustrate the bifurcated character of Renaissance Imi-
tatio is to evoke the sixteenth century Ciceronian controversy. On 
the one hand, purist like Cardinal Bembo (1470-1547), Sadoleto 
(1477-1547), Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1538) and Etienne Dolet 
(1509-1546), have come to look upon Cicero as the only definitive 
standard for Latin composition. They went as far as to use only the 
words and constructions found in Cicero’s works, applying any cir-
cumlocution to achieve this end. Paul Monroe, in an introduction to 
Erasmus’s Ciceeronianus, list two main tenets of the Ciceronians: 1) 
the existence of “an absolute standard in the use of language” (1908, 
14), and, since that absolute standard was most perfectly achieved 
11  Milton’s choice to write in English is informed with another aspect of 
liberty: not merely of language, but of content as well. As he says, he chose English 
not our of “verbal curiosites” which “were a toilsome vanity” but “to be an inter-
preter and relater of the best and sagest things” (Hughes 668). In Of Education, 
first published in 1644 and then republished in Poems, etc upon Several Occasions 
1673, when elaborating the end of language learning, Milton confirms the same 
saying: “the language is but the instrument conveying to us things useful to be 
known” (Hughes 631). He goes as far as to even make a short jab at the linguist 
who “pride[s] himself to have all the tongues that Babel cleft the world into” — an 
achievement Milton finds no more praiseworth than the learning of “any yeoman 
or tradesman competently wise in his mother dialect only” if not paired with the 
study of “the solid things in them [languages] as well as the words and lexicons” 
(ibid). What matters to Milton is the salvaging of thoughts, the wisdom oft he an-
cients, the very reason why „we are taught the languages of those people who have 
at any time been most industrious after wisdom“ (ibid). It is usefull here to quote 
Hale on an emphasis of Milton’s language-learning, namely, the exercise of translat-
ing not merely from original language to target language, and vice versa, but „to go 
round a cirlce of languages, finaly back to the original.” The value of this “circle” 
method Hale sees in that “words and ornaments are bound to be left behind” while 
“the thought is seized, ready to be expressed in whatever tongue. Paradoxically, 
then, so verbal an exercise trains one in skill of thought, as much as skills of words” 
(2005, 10).
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by Cicero, 2) “a proper style of writing Latin in any age and for all 
purposes was to be formed by direct imitation of the master” (1908, 
15). Hence, they defined a rational aesthetics founded on presumably 
universal principles, taking no heed of the passage of time and the 
changes it necessarily brought, favoring instead a constant and uni-
versally applicable ideal12 unaffected by place or time. On the other 
hand, Anti-Ciceronians like Poliziano, Gianfrancesco, and Erasmus, 
opposed purist because their exclusive zeal for Cicero’s style made 
of Latin a “dead” language, devoid of flexibility and accommodating 
capacities that would suit it for all sorts of topics, including those not 
addressed by Cicero himself.13 In Dialogus Ciceronianus [The Cicero-
nian] (1528) Erasmus argument against the Italian purists amount to 
a wide-ranging discussion about the nature of Imitatio. The Imitatio 
Erasmus approves of is an imitation
not enslaved to one set of rules, from the guidelines of which it dare not de-
part, but imitation which gathers from all authors, or at least from the most 
outstanding, the thing which is the chief virtue of each and which suits your 
own cast of mind; imitation which does not immediately incorporate into its 
12  The universal application of the prefect Ciceronian style was somewhat 
contested by the nacionalistic attitude of Ciceronianism which was primarily an 
Italian phenomenon, and whose proponents claimed that “only Italians had the 
true gift of the Latin tongue; other nations, they thought, were automatically pre-
cluded from writing Latin of a quality fit to be called Ciceronian” (Rummel 2003, 
123). One finds this notion persevering well unto Milton, perhaps because of his 
inclination towards Ciceronianism, for we read the following recommendation 
concerning Latin pronounciation: “[Latin] speech is to be fashioned to a distinct 
and clear pronunciation, as near as may be to the Italian, especially in the vowels. 
For we Englishmen, being far northerly, do not open our mouths in the cold air 
wide enough to grace the southern tongue, but are observed by all other nations to 
speak exceeding close and inward; so that to smatter Latin with an English mouth 
is as ill a hearing as law French” (Hughes 1957, 633). The selfsame notion is what 
compels Milton to record with considerable pride his success as a poet among his 
Italian friends in The Reason of Church Government, receiving “written enco-
miums, which the Italian is not forward to bestow on men of this side of Alps” 
(Hughes 1957, 668).
13  The moral and religious effect of such blind devotion to Cicero was the 
primary reason for Erasmus’ diatribe against Ciceronianism, for in their servile ad-
herence to the exact words of Cicero they called God the Father Jupiter Maximus, 
Jesus Apollo, etc. Cardinal Bembo went as far as to warn Sadoleto “to beware lest 
his style be corrupted by reading the Epistles of St. Paul” (Monroe 1908, 9).
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own speech any nice little feature it comes across, but transmits it to the mind 
for inward digestion, so that becoming part of your own system, it gives the 
impression not of something begged from someone else, but of something 
that springs from your own mental processes, something that exudes the 
characteristics and force of your own mind and personality. Your reader will 
see it not as a piece of decoration filched from Cicero, but a child sprung 
from your own brain, the living image of its father, like Pallas form the brain 
of Jove. Your speech will not be a patchwork of a mosaic, but a lifelike por-
trait of the person you really are, a river welling out from your inmost being. 
(Rummel 2003, 133).
 Instead of uplifting one perfect model/standard, Erasmus and 
the Anti-Ciceronians defended a freedom of choosing and combin-
ing from several different models/standards. But more than that, they 
emphasized the internalization of what they have gathered, through a 
process that would assimilate the source beyond recognition and ex-
uding, hence, “the characteristics and force” of one’s own personality. 
Jeanneret at one point claims that Anti-Ciceronians “accepted anach-
ronism as a gauge of freedom, a space for creation and self-assertion” 
(Jeanneret 2001, 243). I am somewhat dubious of this claim, precisely 
because the emphasis Jeanneret puts on assimilation and transforma-
tion. On the one hand, the Anti-Ciceronians were conscious of the 
temporal distance that separated their world from the world of Antiq-
uity. “Wherever I turn I see things changed, I stand on another stage, 
I see another theater, yes, another world” (Erasmus 1908, 62). Hence, 
instead of imagining in the place of the contemporary Christian audi-
ence the Roman Senate and employing the very words of Cicero, they 
imagined how Cicero would speak if he were to live in their age.14 
Liberated from its genuine (and unavailable) historical context, Cice-
ro (and the rest of Antiquity), thus, became their contemporary in an 
imaginary dialogue that varied according to cultural settings, themes 
14  “[I]f Cicero were alive now and endowed with such genius as he was then, 
with such sill of speaking, with such knowledge of our times as he had of his own, if 
he were inflamed with such zeal toward the Christian state as he showed for the Ro-
man City and the majesty of the Roman name, he would speak today as a Christian 
among Christians” (Erasmus 1908, 70 et seq.). 
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and persons engaging in it. But, on the other hand, Anti-Ciceronians 
were loath to commit practical anachronism. “Immoderate love for 
Cicero deceives many, because to adapt the language of Cicero to an 
entirely different theme [one he did not address] is to come out un-
like him” (Erasmus 1908, 77). The “surpassing” element in their prac-
tice of Imitatio liberated them from mere repetition of and subjection 
to the original, but it also makes the description of their practice as 
anachronistic somewhat out of place.15
 Simply put, Imitatio in their praxis was based on the meta-
morphic conception of a work of art, preventing mere duplication. 
In order to avoid the trap of repetition and subjection, the model one 
imitated was interiorized and absorbed to the point when it became 
an integral part of the imitator’s system and, hence, indistinguish-
able from it. This way, the division between past and present was 
suspended, and one (if gifted) produced a unique voice out of many. 
And not only that. The division between writer and reader was also 
suspended, for this way the author was seen as reader appropriating 
and transforming source-texts (Jeanneret 2001, 241).
 Reading, thus, becomes writing, and the metamorphosis from 
one to the other was often described in terms of digestive metaphors 
going back to antiquity. The bee metaphor in particular emphasizes 
the process of assimilation and transformation. One ought to fol-
low the example of the bees, says Seneca, in sifting whatever one has 
gathered from a varied course of reading and “so blend those several 
flavours into one delicious compound that, even though it betrays its 
origin, yet it nevertheless is clearly a different thing from whence it 
came” (Ep. 84.5). As in the production of honey, the food consumed 
15  In this respect, I have found Richard Rorty’s observation on rational and 
historical reconstruction of philosophy quite useful. He claims that the two genres 
of the historiography of philosophy, namely, historical and rational reconstructions 
of philosophy, can never be quite independent, because, one cannot reconstruct 
what dead thinkers would have said to their contemporaries (historical reconstruc-
tion) unless we try to relate his thoughts to what we ourselves might want to say 
(the anachronisitc endeavour of rational reconstruction), hence, treating them as 
our own contemporaries with whom we might exchange views (1984, 49-56). 
Erasmus certainly exhibits both reconstructions, when expressing an awareness of 
Cicero’s historical context and, at the same time, imagining Cicero as his own con-
temporary. 
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must change from its original form to become tissue and blood. 
Hence, in case of food nourishing our “higher nature”, we must “see 
to it that whatever we have absorbed should not be allowed to remain 
unchanged, or it will be no part of us. We must digest it; otherwise it 
will merely pass into the memory and not into our very being” (Ep. 
84.6-7).
 Erasmus also employs the apian metaphor in his struggle 
against the Ciceronians, emphasizing both its collecting/gathering 
and the creative/transformative aspect. Milton, however, makes no 
direct allusion to it, but employs digestive metaphors which empha-
size the importance of transformation, although, in a rather compli-
cated way.
 In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643/1644), Mil-
ton presumes the reason why custom among teachers and masters 
(like virtue and conscience) attracts the most disciples and is consid-
ered the best instructor: 
because her method is so glib and easy, in some manner like to that vision 
of Ezekiel rolling up her sudden book of implicit knowledge for him that 
will to take and swallow down at pleasure; which proving but of bad nour-
ishment in the concoction, as it was heedless in the devouring, puffs up 
unhealthily a certain big face pretended learning mistaken among credulous 
men for the wholesome habit of soundness and good constitution, but is 
indeed no other than the swollen visage of counterfeit knowledge and litera-
ture… (Hughes 1957, 696-697)
 According to Peter M. McCluskey, Milton here “shows that 
if food is knowledge, then bad knowledge causes indigestion” (1997, 
229) resulting in flatulence of folly; flatulence “being the symbol 
of corrupt doctrine” (228). However, he does not quote the whole 
passage and, hence, omits the reference to Ezekiel which perplexed 
Hughes: “The roll symbolized the prophet’s message, and Milton’s use 
of it here hardly harmonizes with its Biblical context” (1957, 696n3). 
I assume that Hughes’ thoughts on custom’s “sudden book of implicit 
knowledge” were similar to that of McCluskey in perceiving it as false 
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teaching per se. In reference to reading, Milton in Areopagitica permits 
that “[b]ad meats will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthi-
est concoction”, nevertheless, he confidently claims that “wholesome 
meats to vitiated stomach differ little or nothing from unwholesome” 
(Hughes 1957, 727). Moreover, he notes that bad books “to a discrete 
and judicious reader serve in many respect to discover, to confute, to 
forewarn, and to illustrate” (ibid). What matters, thus, is not what en-
ters into a man, be it bad or good, but rather the process of digestion 
– for even Ezekiel prophecies might prove “of bad nourishment in 
the concoction” (italics mine). Custom causes flatulence not necessarily 
because of its unhealthy content, but because it is “swallow[ed] down 
at pleasure” in a “heedless devouring” (696). Hence, those puffed up 
with custom are envious and censorious of “aught that sorts not with 
their unchewed notions and suppositions” (697 – italics mine). The 
digestive process starts in the mouth with chewing,16 and we should, 
as Quintilian notes, “consign our food to our stomach only when it is 
masticated and almost dissolved, in order that it may be easier of di-
gestion” (Inst. X.1.19).17 Hence, in The Doctrine and Discipline of Di-
vorce, custom’s book is a “book of implicit knowledge” for those that 
gorge on it, swallowing it “uchewed”, and, consequently, sporting a 
“swollen visage of counterfeit knowledge and literature.” As Raphael 
warns Adam in Book Seven of Paradise Lost: “Knowledge is a food, 
and needs no less / Her Temperance over Appetite”, otherwise it op-
presses “with Surfet, and soon turns / Wisdom to Folly, as Nourish-
ment to Winde” (126-130).18 
16  On Renaissance notions of physical digestion see Albala 2002, 54-66 
(especially p. 56 on chewing).
17  Quintilian speaks of reading in terms of digestion. In the passage quoted 
from Instituto oratoria, he accentuates the freedom in reading as opposed to speech 
which “escapes us with the rapidity of oral delivery.” Reading, thus, allows for care-
full deliberation equated with chewing, since one can commit to memory and re-
serve for imitation what one has read “not when it is in a crude state, but after being 
softened, and as it were triturated, by frequent repetition” (X.1.19).
18  As “unchewed” devouring of custom leads to implicit knowledge, so does 
that of Scripture lead to implicit faith. Milton in Of True Religion notes, that 
implicit faith comes from “much hearing and small proficience, till want of funda-
mental knowledge easily turns to superstition or popery”  in the same way to im-
plicite faith” and reminds his readers of Eph 4:14 (1835, 565). The extent to which 
Milton uses the images of flatulence (see McCluskey 1997, 227-238) it is hard to 
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The assimilation and transformation of the source-text, therefore, de-
pended on its mental digestion. Indeed, the physiological meaning 
of the verb digest is listed only as the fourth in the OED, and is pre-
ceded by meanings like consider, to settle and arrange methodically, 
to reduce into a systematic form, to classify, and also to divide and 
dispose, to distribute (s.v. digest 3; 2; 1).19 
 Milton’s famous dragon’s teeth comparison in Areopagitica 
deserves to be mentioned here too. “I know that they [books] are as 
lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon’s teeth; 
and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed man” 
(Hughes 1957, 720). Catherine Gimelli Martin recognizes in it an 
almost verbatim paraphrase from Bacon’s Advancement of Learning:
the images of men’s wits and knowledge remain in books, exempted from 
the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they 
fitly to be called images, because they generate still, can cast their seed in 
the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in 
succeeding ages […] that whatsoever motions the spirit of man could act 
and perform without the organs of the body […] might remain after death. 
(1854, 183; Martin 2010, 132)
 Bacon is clearly emphasizing the potential of literature to 
continuously generate, casting new seeds in the minds of others and, 
hence, provoke and cause actions and opinions in succeeding ages.20 
imagine “every wind of doctrine” in Eph 4:14 without some repugnant odor (or 
fishie fume).  
19  Jeanneret in The Feast of Words: Banquets and Table Talks int he Renaissance 
(1991) also notes the combination of physiological with the more general sense of 
to separate, sort out, order or classify in the sixteenth-century French and in the 
Latin digerere. He also makes note of digestion as a figure of rhetoric (in Cicero 
and Quintilian) whereby a general idea is divided into particular points implying 
classification and setting out (136).
20  One should, of course, note that Bacon puts an equal emphasis on their 
time enduring capacity as opposed to that of more solid structures, like statues and 
buildings, which were not „exempted from the wrong of time.” In this respect, what 
Bacon lauds is contrary to Jeanneret’s and my own emphasis on transformation 
for, in Bacon’s words, their capacity of endurance lies in maintaining their original 
form: “For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years, or 
more, without the loss of a syllable or letter” (1854, 183).
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But Bacon’s seeds seem “gentler” than Milton’s “dragon’s teeth” in that 
the latter are capable of “springing up armed men.” It is a general 
assumption that Milton took this image from Ovid’s story of Cad-
mus, and in doing so evoked also the image of civil war.21 Thus, Mar-
tin, following Nigel Smith, recalls Henry Parker’s use of the Cadmus 
myth “for the same political purpose: to show that multiple branches 
of ‘knowledge in the making’ are essential to ‘the reforming of Ref-
ormation itself ’” (2010, 132).22 Civil war is similarly the outcome of 
Joad Raymond’s reading, who draws our attention to another aspect 
of Renaissance book production, namely, that “small books were in-
deed sewn up and down, being stitched together instead of bound; 
and that in 1642 stitched book did indeed ‘spring up armed men’” 
(2003, 203). However, I would like to suggest another, Erasmian in-
terpretation that seems to me more in line with Milton’s particular 
argument about “lively and vigorously productive” books.
 In a dialogue on the right way of speaking Latin and Greek, 
De recta pronuntiatione (1528) — a topic dear to Milton as well —, 
Erasmus connects the myth of Cadmus’s sowing the dragon’s teeth 
with the traditional assumption that Cadmus introduced writing to 
the Greeks. For, as he explains, if one were to look and “count the 
top teeth and the bottom teeth” in the dragon’s mount, one “would 
find the number of letters that Cadmus introduced” from Phoeni-
cia (Erasmus 1985a, 396). In allegorizing the sowing of the dragon’ 
21  In Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Cadmus, instructed by Athena, sowed the drag-
on’s teeth in to the ground, from which sprang a race of armed men. Cadmus fear-
ing a new battle (he had just slain the dragon whose teeth he sow) prepared to arm 
for defense, but one of the earth-born cried: “Arm not! Away from civil wars!” A 
fierce massacre ensued with only five warriors surviving, who later assisted Cadmus 
in founding Thebes (3.95-137).
22  The context in which Parker refers to the dragon’s teeth (and the fact that 
he writes it with a capital D) suggest the identification of the dragon with Papal 
Rome: “The main Engineers in the Civil Warre are Papists, the most poisonous, 
serpentine, Iesuited Papist of the World. And the Papist in Europe either pay for the 
prosperity of the design, or here contribute some other influence and assistance to 
it. This warre was not the production of these last two years, nor was England alon 
the field wherein the Dragon’s teeth were sown” (Parker 1643, 9; in Smith 1990, 
110). Smith is careful not to draw a too close parallel when noting that the image 
of dragon’s teeth in Milton „becomes the image of active republic, full of vibrant, 
energetic individuals“ (111).
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teeth, Erasmus is not merely explicating on his favorite word, sermo 
[speech] (for “the word ‘say’ and ‘sow,’ sermo and sero, share the same 
root” [397])23 but providing a vivid, albeit brief, image of his notion 
of language as praxis: “When they [the teeth] are in their original 
[alphabetical] order they are inert. Scatter them, sow them, let them 
multiply, distribute them in different combinations, and they will be-
come alive, active and aggressive” (396-397). In other words, the true 
potential of the letters is realized only in distribution, in multiplica-
tion and in their reorganization in various combinations; only this 
way can they become a force. The fact that Milton compares books 
and not letters to the dragon’s teeth is not an obstacle to a fruitful ap-
plication of Erasmus’ interpretation. As the fruits of the seed planted 
provide new seeds for planting, so do books composed of “dragon’s 
teeth” provide new “teeth” for sowing. But for them to rise up armed 
man, they too must not remain inert in their original form of compo-
sition, but must be scattered, sown, and their content distributed in 
different combination. This is how posterity would not willingly let a 
work die. “Success does not lie in accomplishment but in the impetus 
give to posterity […] the essential pole of the book is in the future, 
with the recipient who will act as relay, carry on the production and 
pass it along in turn” (Jeanneret 2001, 211).
23  In the second of the five editions of his New Testament, Novum Testa-
mentum omne (1519), Erasmus made the controversial substitution of sermo for 
verbum in John 1:1, a change to which Erasmus clung almost obstinately, even in 
face of bitter opposition (especially, if one considers his mellowing stance on Com-
ma Johanneum, the 1 John 5: 7-8 passage he omitted from the first two editions, 
but supplied from the third edition (1522) on). As Barnett notes, “Erasmus seldom 
interests himself in meaning independent of speakers and their performances. For 
him the speaker speaking seems to be an essential factor in the efficacy of a discourse 
generally, and […] particularly important in relation to the degree to which dis-
course can successfully perform an ethical function” (1996, 558). In this contexts, 
the importance of Erasmus’ word choice lies in asserting Christ as the speech of 
God, reflecting his rhetorical activity; and, consequently, the notion of imitation 
Christi as speaking eloquently with the objective of “eliciting tears of contrition 
and inflaming the hearts of their listeners” (545). Waswo sees in this substation of 
semro (speech) for verbum (word) a reflection of the semantic shift he exposes in 
Language and Meaning in the Renaissance, for it reveals “the humanist practice of 
locating meaning less in single, discrete words and more in whole utterances and 
propositions, larger units that presuppose the semantic importance of usage and 
context” (1987, 220)
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The relevance of a work is, therefore, determined by its reception. The 
more room a work leaves for the reader to intervene, lending itself 
to various operations and appropriations, the better. Renaissance au-
thors intuitively understood that the future of their works depended 
on a collaboration with their readers, hence, they had to appeal to the 
reader’s intelligence and stimulate his imagination. And the best way 
to engage the mind of the recipient party is by applying variety. For 
“variety is so powerfull in every sphere”, claims Erasmus, 
that there is absolutely nothing, however brilliant, which is not dimmed 
if not commended by variety… Just as the eyes fasten themselves on some 
new spectacle, so the mind is always looking for some fresh object of inter-
est. If it is offered a monotonous succession of similarities, it very soon wea-
ries and turns its attention elsewhere, and so everything gained by a speech 
is lost all at once. This disaster can easily be avoided by someone who has it 
at his fingertips to turn one idea into more shapes than Proteus himself is 
supposed to have turned into. (1978, 302).
 The ability to turn an idea into more shapes than Proteus is 
not useful only in speech acts, but in writing too (although, I will 
return to the significance of speech later, in conclusion). Especially, 
since for Erasmus writing was in essence “just silent speech” (1985a, 
397). Variety lets the speaker/writer avoid two sources of tedium: tau-
tology, the repetition of a word or phrase, and homoiology, identical 
repetition with even less variation, both boring the “wretched audi-
ence to death” (1978, 302). But variety does not only keep the audi-
ence/readers’ attention alert. In the Ratio verae theologiae, Erasmus 
applies protean versatility to Christ himself, noting that variety does 
not “disturbe this harmony [of Christ], but as a composition of dif-
ferent voices is rendered more agreeable, the variety of Christ makes 
harmony more complete.”24 
24  In his Ratio verae theologiae (1518): ”Neque vero confundit hanc har-
moniam Christi varietas; immo sicut e diversis vocibus apte compositis concentus 
suavissiumus redditur, ita Christi varietas pleniorem efficit concentum. Sic omnia 
factus est omnibus, út nusquam tamen sui dissimilis esset” (Holborn 211:28-31). 
For a discussion of Erasmus’s fascination with the protean persona of Christ in the 
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 In a section of one of his antiprelatical tracts, the Animadver-
sions (1641), Milton argues against a set form of liturgy in a simi-
lar fashion. The tract is written as a dialogue between Remonstrant, 
voicing a selected quote from the opponent, and Milton, offering 
a polemical reply. The suggestion that prescribed words of a prayer 
help people be more intent on orison and less distracted is met with 
Milton asserting the opposite: the continuous use of the same words 
makes one careless, even sleepy. It is “variety” that “erects and rouses 
an auditory, like the masterful running over many chords and divi-
sions; whereas if men should be ever be thumbing the drone of one 
plain song, it would be a dull opiate to the most wakeful attention” 
(Fletcher 1835, 62). Milton elaborates the same thought in more de-
tail and with more irony when writing Eikonoklastes (first published in 
1649, then again with additions in 1650). He emphasizes the tyranny 
of prescribed litany and the servility of those following it. Exasperated 
by the argument that we are all to pray the same words because we 
pray to the same God, Milton ironically exclaims: “Let us then use 
but one word, because we pray to one God” (314). Moreover, in a fit 
of extremes he compares the prescribed words of a prayer to the heav-
enly manna, which “hoarded up and enjoined us […] will be found, 
like reserved manna, rather to breed worms and stink” (ibid).25 And 
although Milton acknowledges that we have duties upon us, and feel 
the same wants, he adds: 
yet not always the same, nor at all times alike; but with variety of circum-
stances, which ask variety of words: whereof God hath given us plenty; 
not to use so copiously upon all other occasions, and so niggardly to him 
alone in our devotion… as [God] left our affections to be guided by his 
light of his concept on individuality see Bietenholz 1966, 79-89.
25  During their exodus the Israelites were fed by God with manna (Ex 
16), an edible substance they had to gather each day anew, for stored up for the 
next day it “bred worms and stank” (Ex 16:20). The only exception being that of 
manna provided on the day before Sabbath, which was twice the amount usu-
ally gathered and did not spoil the next day to accord the Sabbath ordinance 
(Ex 16:23-24). It is interesting to note again, how Milton manages to compare 
the prescribed prayers to manna and, yet, by that very comparison establish the 
unpremeditated prayer as the true manna whose “new” expressions “God every 
morning rains down… into our hearts” (Fletcher 1835, 314).
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sanctifying spirit, so did he likewise our words to be put into us without 
our premeditation; not only those cautious words to be used before gentiles 
and tyrants, but much more those filial words, of which we have so frequent 
use in our access with freedom of speech to the throne of grace. (Fletcher 
1835, 314-315)
It is no surprise, therefore, that Milton’s Adam and Eve offer their 
orisions each morning 
In various style, for neither various style 
Nor holy rapture wanted they to praise 
Thir Maker, in fit strains pronounc’t or sung 
Unmeditated, such prompt eloquence 
Flowd from thir lips, in Prose or numerous Verse.  
(5.146-150).
Moreover, the variety of their prayers reflects the variety perceived in 
Creation in general, or vice versa:
Aire, and ye Elements the eldest birth 
Of Natures Womb, that in quaternion run 
Perpetual Circle, multiform; and mix 
And nurish all things, let your ceasless change 
Varie to our great Maker still new praise. (5.180-184)
Waswo would no doubt delight to know, that Milton too insisted “on 
the semantic principle of context” (1987, 222), that necessitated dif-
ferent words for different circumstances. At the same time, he would 
also note (although not specifically in this passage but elsewhere in 
Milton) what he calls the discrepancy between theory and practice 
in Renaissance language debates. Namely, “[w]hen language is talked 
about, it is consciously regarded as the clothing of preexistent mean-
ings, but when language is employed to reflect on its various func-
tions […] it is often implicitly regarded as constitutive of meaning” 
(60). The former, Waswo calls the “cosmetic view” while the latter he 
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terms the “constitutive mode.” The difference is between 
regarding language as the clothing or container of thoughts, feelings, ob-
jects, and meanings that have a separate existence elsewhere and regarding 
it as constituting those thoughts, feelings, objects, and meanings in the very 
act of articulating them – just as a melody in constituted by, and is insepa-
rable from, its sounds and the relations among them. […] the theoretical 
opposition between these views is a product of all the subsequent reflection 
on language that has crystallized clearer issues out of what remained for 
Renaissance thinkers and writers a rather murkier solution of assumptions. 
(Waswo 1987, 60-61)
 Hence, in his chapter on Erasmus, Waswo praises the human-
ist scholar for his recipes of variation for implicitly treating “meaning 
as context- and purpose-dependent”, while emphasizing the above 
mentioned discrepancy since “words are” for Erasmus “still explic-
itly conceived as semantically cosmetic” as seen in his copious use 
of the “standard formula — ‘what clothing is to our body, style is to 
thought’” (1987, 216-217). Milton also applies this “formula” time 
and time again, and perhaps most prominently in his At a Vacation 
Exercise in the College.26 Furthermore, the practice of giving variety to 
expression as the quotation from Eikonoklastes suggests (“variety of 
circumstances, which ask variety of words”) is, to use Erasmus’ words, 
“exactly like changing clothes” (Barnett 1996, 552). 
 However, I think that Waswo’s choice of term “cosmetic” is 
misleading in respect to Renaissance way of thinking about words as 
clothing thoughts. The adjective “cosmetic” is definitively derogatory 
in Waswo’s use, indicating the subjected status of words in a binary 
hierarchy with words. It allows words/clothes a mere decorative role, 
that has no constitutive value. Hence, I don’t think that cosmetic(s) 
appropriately describes what Renaissance thinkers thought clothes 
26  Addressing his “native Language” Milton writes: “…haste thee straight 
to do me once a Pleasure, / And from thy wardrobe bring thy chiefest treasure; / 
[…] /I have some naked thoughts that rove about / And loudly knock to have their 
passage out; /And wearie of their place do only stay / Till thou hast deck’t them in 
thy best ar[r]ay” (17-26).
61
Larisa Kocic-Zámbóné
(and words) do. Clothes do make a man, and they especially did so in 
the Renaissance. The sumptuary laws, dictated both by the national 
and local government, and legislating what items of dress could be 
worn by various ranks of people, were enacted in the spirit of this 
commonplace. The concern with the proper standard of dress (espe-
cially the subversive use of clothes) was no where so accentuated as in 
the antitheatrical writings of the age. As Cerasano notes: 
Accounts of the Elizabethan theater are replete with references to the sump-
tuary laws and the frequent complaints against players who “jett in their 
silks” thus aping their social betters. Finally the playing companies were 
capable of purchasing clothing that individual actors were legally prohibited 
from wearing except on the stage where they impersonated those who had 
sold them the clothes, thus “borrowing” both robe and title. (1994, 55)
However, the issue at question is far more complicated and bur-
rows deeper than simple borrowing of “robe and title.” Paraphrasing 
Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-two, Phillip Stubbes writes: “Apparel 
was giuen vs as a signe distinctiue to discern betwixt sex and sex, 
& therefore on to wear the Apparel of another sex is to participate 
with the same, and to adulterate the verities of his own kinde” (1583, 
73). By borrowing an apparel of a different gender one put one’s own 
gender in jeopardy, for the act meant participation “with the same” 
with consequential adulteration of one’s own true nature. Clothes are, 
therefore, seen not merely as separable adornments but also as con-
stitutive (participating in) of the very things they clothed, because 
they were able to adulterate them, that is change them by addition. 
All in all, I do not see such a discrepancy between the Renaissance 
theory and practice of language. The theoretical opposition between 
the referential (Waswo’s cosmetic) and relational (constitutive) views 
is, as Waswo himself notes, “a product of all the subsequent reflection 
on language” but I am still in doubt whether this subsequent theo-
retical opposition “crystallized clearer issues”, and would positively 
deny that these issues “remained for Renaissance thinkers and writ-
ers a rather murkier solution of assumptions” (see Waswo 1987, 61). 
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The reason why one perceives such a discrepancy in the first place 
is, as noted above, that Renaissance thinkers indeed thought about 
language doing both: referring to their thoughts and construing them 
at the same time, just as their metaphors on clothing suggest. And it 
is precisely this “adulterating” power of clothes/words to change by 
addition that is facilitated by the ability to turn one idea into more 
shapes than Proteus.
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